From 2002 to 2006, German wholesale electricity prices more than doubled. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the price components in 2006 in order to identify the factors responsible for the increase.
Introduction
Market power is a significant issue for restructured electricity markets around the world. At the same time, questions about resource adequacy of investments in generation have resurged both in the U.S. and in Europe, driven by concerns about supply security. The German electricity market has undergone significant changes in the last decade, yet the scientific discussion about the appropriate market design is still in its infancy. Since the first EU liberalization directive 96/92/EC was promulgated, Germany has taken almost a decade to address critical issues such as network tariff regulation and market monitoring. Since 2006, the newly established regulator ("Bundesnetzagentur") has published cost-based revisions of transmission and distribution network tariffs, and is now considering alternative instruments of congestion management, cross-border trading, etc; incentive regulation should be operational by 2009. Current political discussion has begun to focus on the generation sector, especially since average spot prices at the European Energy Exchange (EEX) rose by almost 125% from 2002 to 2006. However, a price increase is no proof of malfunctioning markets or market power abuse; during the same period fuel prices rose significantly and the Europe's emissions allowance trading scheme was implemented. On the other hand, the oligopolistic structure of Germany's generation market particularly lends itself to abuse, with a duopoly controlling over 55% of market share, and the largest four firms owning almost 85%. This paper analyzes the level of competition in the country's wholesale electricity markets, by comparing the observed prices with estimated costs and market clearing prices under the hypothesis of perfect competition. We develop a competitive benchmark model testing the observed EEX market prices for 2006. We hypothesize that the oligopolistic structure of electricity generation leads to significant price mark-ups when compared to short-term marginal costs.
In the next section, a survey of market power analysis in other countries (mainly the US. and the UK) and the most recent studies on Germany are provided. Section 3 presents the competitive benchmark model and introduces the data. The analysis is based on publicly available data on electricity prices, generation capacities and costs, wind input, and cross-border flows for 2006. We find that the observed prices exceed marginal costs especially in peak load situations. We also present the earned revenues of generators in 2006 based on the model's spot market structure. The results are confirmed by sensitivity analyses that account for plant availability and price uncertainty. We conclude that market power is an influential feature of Germany's electricity markets, and should be addressed by more competition-oriented market design.
2 Literature review on market power
International empirical literature
Market power normally is defined as the ability to profitably alter prices away from competitive levels (Mas-Collel et al. 1995, p. 383) . Thus one of the main questions of estimating market power abuse is to determine the "right" approximation of competitive levels. The modeling approach used is generally referred to as competitive benchmark. Complex approaches like Cournot or Supply Function Equilibria often use it as a starting point or as additional information to classify the model results.
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The chief goal of the benchmarking approach is to estimate a competitive supply function in terms of marginal costs. In a fully competitive market no player can influence the clearing price; thus the simulated supply function in combination with a given demand level yields the competitive benchmark. Arranging the plants according to increasing marginal costs yields the competitive supply curve and the difference between simulated and observed market prices allows quantifying the extent of market power. Stoft (2002, p. 129) shows that marginal cost pricing suffices to cover the capital cost of investment, because price spikes will occur in periods of shortages. An in-depth discussion of the issue is provided by Hogan (2007) , Crampton and Stoft (2006), and Joskow (2007) . At this point, we note that the marginal costs should set the competitive prices when the market is characterized by overcapacity.
When monopolistic, oftentimes vertically integrated electricity companies predominated, there was neither room nor need for market power analysis. The restructuring of the North American and British electricity markets opened the way to rigorous market power analysis. Wolfram (1999) was among the first to apply a competitive benchmark analysis to the electricity market of England and Wales. She found significant markups during the observed period covering 18 months in 1992, 1993 and 1994, although the generators were not taking full advantage of the inelastic demand as oligopoly models predict. Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak (2002) and Joskow and Kahn (2002) used the competitive benchmark approach to analyze the California market. Both found that in summer 2000, observed prices differed from the competitive benchmark price levels which could not be explained by load, imports, gas prices or NO x -allowance prices. Mansur (2001) undertook an analysis of the PJM market calculating a demand-weighted Lerner index of 0.293, an indicator of significant market power abuse.
A drawback of competitive benchmark analysis is the necessary simplification when estimating the supply curve. Electricity markets are highly complex and access to information is generally sparse; therefore, models make assumptions that may influence the outcome. Typically the simulation is static neglecting start-up and shut-down costs or minimum load constraints. Missing information about plant outages may compound the outcome. Also, the grid is not generally considered a market component.
Thus, network congestion which can lead to market prices above marginal costs is ignored. Harvey and Hogan (2002) undertook a sensitivity test of competitive benchmark analysis by reproducing the results and estimating the impact of varying assumptions, and concluded that the differences obtained by simulation could result from the real-world constraints that were omitted from the model.
German empirical literature
The wholesale electricity market in Germany is dominated by four companies owning about 85% of conventional power plant capacity. The German Cartel Office assumes a dominant duopoly consisting of E.ON and RWE owning about 60% of generation (Bundeskartellamt, 2006) . Given this oligopolistic structure, the question arises whether the observed market outcomes represent competitive behavior or whether market power is applied.
Müsgens (2006) followed by a break leading to a divergence between them that lasted until the end of the observation period. He assumed that strategic company behavior and learning effects were the main reasons for the observed differences. Next, Ellersdorfer (2005) used a two-period Cournot model to study the impact of long-term contracts on the oligopolistic model. A competitive benchmark used as well also concluded that a significant difference between modeled and observed market prices existed.
In a more recent study, Schwarz and Lang (2006) Other studies of Germany's competitiveness have employed strategic or econometric approaches. Zachmann (2006) compared the German and British electricity markets using Markov Switching, concluding that the British market had a closer relation to marginal costs . Kemfert and Traber (2007) applied a strategic model of the German electricity sector to combine market power and climate policy analysis to find that the German wholesale market attained full competition. Hirschhausen and Zachmann (2007) tested the impact of emission allowance pricing on electricity wholesale prices in Germany. Based on an error correction model and an autoregressive distributed lag model they found that the price for emission allowances is passed through asymmetrically: allowance price increases are translated into electricity price increases more rapidly than decreases.
However, the impact of market power on price formation is not unilaterally accepted. General electricity market analyses of Germany with respect to market power are presented by Weber and Vogel (2007) and Ockenfels (2007a) . These and other authors agree that the lack of full information in the empirical model approaches is viewed as a source of unreliability. Due to a steep merit order close to peak capacity, the impacts of incorrect availability or price assumptions can produce large, absolute errors. In addition the non-linear complexity of electricity markets with many external impact factors (wind speed, temperature, and technical restrictions) contribute to the difficulty of designing a fully realistic model. Swider et al. (2007) show these issues exemplary for existing model approaches and specific time periods. Like Harvey and Hogan (2002) they show that every model has some level of uncertainty and thus will produce a range of possible outcomes. Melzian and Ehlers (2007) studied the pricing mechanism at the EEX, and concluded that the structure of the German market makes EEX prices an improper benchmark. They argue that since price formation at the EEX is mainly driven by missing or excess capacity of forward contracts, the price cannot be considered as system marginal price. Ehlers and Erdmann (2007) also analyzed the EEX pricing formation and concluded that the traded volumes and supply and demand curves do not allow a significant price manipulation. We assume that EEX prices act as the benchmark for most bilateral and long-term trades in Germany's electricity market because it is the only transparent price available.
The problem of fixed cost covering and short-term marginal costs has been addressed by Müller (2007) and Ockenfels (2007b) . Müller simulated a simplified electricity market with base, mid and peak load units to estimate the revenues each plant type earns in a competitive market based on shortterm marginal costs. He concluded that in an optimal market segmentation with respect to installed capacity, even base load plants will not cover their fixed costs. Ockenfels (2007b) argues that under competitive conditions, market prices above marginal costs are possible and necessary to cover fixed costs. Whenever demand exceeds available capacities, the market price is set according to consumers' willingness to pay. Due to the low elasticity in electricity markets this can lead to significant mark-ups on marginal costs. We note, however, that this situation did not prevail in 2006 since the German electricity market was subject to overcapacities.
2 Section 4.3 of our paper discusses fixed cost covering in more detail.
Model and Data
This section describes the approach to the competitive benchmark analysis and the data used, the objective being to derive estimates for the true marginal costs which are then compared with the prices at Germany's wholesale electricity market EEX. The model simulates a wholesale market in which all demand is cleared via a single market process. However, only about 20% of total consumption is traded via the EEX. Since the EEX is the only public source available, we assume the EEX spot market acts as benchmark and as a marker price for OTC trading. Demand (load) data is provided by UCTE for each hour in 2006. We assume that trading is a competitive activity, so that only generators exercise market power.
Model formulation
The model is designed as a cost-minimizing approach with a given hourly demand level d that must be satisfied:
costs min 
The model minimizes the total generation costs consisting of the sum of marginal generation costs c and the necessary start-up costs (startup). The generation g of each plant p must remain within the minimum and maximum capacity constraints in case the plant is operating. The status of a plant is determined with the binary condition variable on. The total sum of generation must equal the externally defined demand d in any considered hour t. The timeframe for each model run is one month. Network constraints are not considered and thus losses are not taken into account.
Since fossil plants are restricted by thermal conditions, they cannot be turned on/off within seconds.
According to type of plant, start-up can take a few minutes (small gas turbines) up to several days (nuclear). Therefore, it is necessary to decide on the status of a plant before the actual demand situation occurs. Following Takriti et al. (1998) , we define a minimum online and offline constraint:
Since the time interval referred to is one hour, only the offline constraint has been used, assuming that each plant can be shut down after one hour of operation. Nuclear plants are assumed to supply base load and therefore are must-run plants that cannot be shut down. We assume that gas turbines and hydro plants are able to go online within an hour. Therefore, no separate constraints are necessary.
Coal, steam and CCGT plants are modeled with specific start-up times l p according to Schröter (2004, p. 39) . Start-up costs are based on DENA (2005, p.280). These costs are added as a cost block startup p t in the period of the start-up. As Germany has a large fraction of combined heat and power producing plants (CHP) particularly in the industry sector, these plants are treated as must run plants with a specific minimum output level. We assume that CHP plants must run at least 50% of their maximum electrical capacity in winter, 30% in spring and fall, and 20% in summer. A detailed hourly heat profile is not used.
The only way to store larger amounts of electricity is by using hydro pumped-storage plants (PSP The model is implemented in GAMS as a combination of a mixed integer problem for the unit commitment and an optimization problem with fixed binary plant condition variables for the actual dispatch.
Generation capacity and demand level
The hourly demand level for Germany (UCTE, 2007) ranges between 75 GW at peak and 35 GW at off-peak times. The German electricity market is a winter-peaking market with significantly less demand in the summer months. Generation capacity is characterized by overcapacity. Total generation capacity is about 120 GW including renewable energy sources (VDN, 2005) . The basic plant list we obtained from VGE (2005 VGE ( , 2006 includes all conventional facilities in Germany with more than 100 MW generation capacities by plant and fuel types. Available/installed capacity may differ according to weather conditions, maintenance, or outages, requiring adjustments to prevent an overestimation of available plant capacity and an underestimation of prices in our simulation. To account for these effects, seasonal availability factors for each plant type are used according to Hoster (1996) with the highest level of availability in winter months. Since our analysis is based on single hours, the generalization can lead to divergences in specific cases (e.g., a plant outage of a large coal block). We defined a minimum running capacity for each plant according to DENA (2004, p. 280) .
Part of the available capacity may be sold abroad and therefore can not be used to cover the German demand. Lack of publicly available information restricts the possibility to deal with this issue directly within the plant list. Therefore, we calculated the total trading balance based on actual cross-border power flows (ETSOVista, 2007) . 4 The resulting net flow into or out of Germany is considered in the total demand level. Thus when energy is imported, a portion of Germany's demand is covered by foreign plants, reducing the necessary amount of domestic generation and vice versa. However, the modeled prices represent the upper bound in cases of net exports, since plants above market price can be used for exports, and a lower bound in cases of net imports since a foreign generator can set the market price in Germany.
Germany has a large amount of renewable energy, in particular wind (19 GW in 2006) and the actual demand level to be satisfied by conventional plants varies considerably. Therefore, we reduced demand by calculating the hourly wind input for the analyzed days. 5 We neglected other renewable sources like solar and bio mass due to their relatively small installed capacities.
Cost estimates and start-up conditions
To estimate the marginal cost curve ("merit order") for electricity generation fuel type and fuel prices are needed. The efficiency of each plant is estimated using the age as a proxy: for coal, lignite, oil/gas fired steam plants, CCGT plants and gas turbines, the link between the age and the efficiency are taken from Schröter (2004) . Nuclear plants are assumed to have an average efficiency of 33% (Müller, 2001 ) and hydro plants have 100% efficiency.
Fuel prices for coal, oil and natural gas are based on wholesale price levels of reference, thus we do not consider transportation costs or transmission fees. 6 The price for steam coal is based on prices for internationally traded coal at ARA, daily natural gas prices are taken from the Dutch market TTF, and oil prices are daily Brent prices. For nuclear plants, fuel costs of 3 €/MWh are assumed leading to generation costs of 9 €/MWh. With the introduction of Europe's emission allowance trading scheme in 2005 an additional cost element has to be considered when estimating electricity prices. Allowance prices can be accounted for as opportunity costs of production. Therefore, we calculated plant-specific CO 2 -emissions based on efficiency and plant type following Gampe (2004) . The emissions are valued with the allowance price taken from EEX (2007b) and added to the fuel and operation costs.
5 The actual energy input depends on wind speeds and is published on an hourly basis by the four German TSOs. 6 Due to the volatility of wholesale prices particularly for oil and natural gas, generators are expected to sign contracts for their fuel supply. The pricing details of these contracts are not publicly available. We assume that wholesale prices are sufficient to reflect the average price level. However, this can lead to divergences for specific plants. 7 Nuclear is not the marginal supplier in the relevant periods, so that the estimate of its marginal costs does not change the resulting prices.
The marginal generation costs c of a plant in any considered hour t consist of the fuel costs based on plant efficiency η and fuel price, operating costs, and opportunity costs for emissions based on plantspecific CO 2 emissions and the allowance price at the EEX: 
Results and sensitivity analysis
We compare the modeled market prices with observed priced at the EEX for all hours of 2006, obtaining markups, withheld capacity and earned revenues for fixed costs coverage. To testify the results two sensitivity analyses are carried out. First the uncertainty regarding exact fuel prices is considered by increasing gas and oil prices (which mainly influence peak units). Second, plant availability is reduced to estimate the impact of uncertainty about technical and external restrictions on generation structures.
Market power and price mark-ups
The basic model approach uses twelve runs (one for each month) to simulate the wholesale market in 2006 and find the competitive market outcomes. The simulated prices and the EEX prices behave similarly with a clear segmentation between off-peak and peak prices. However, in off-peak periods, EEX prices often drop below marginal generation costs and sometimes even reach zero, whereas the model prices reach a level, representing coal and lignite fired base load plants. In general, prices below marginal costs are explained by start-up conditions since the temporary shut-down of a base load plant can become more expensive than maintaining operations without revenues. Because our model is based on perfect knowledge, we note that the price difference may be due to asymmetric information (e.g., bidders' "wrong" expectations about market conditions. Furthermore the model includes emission allowance prices as opportunity costs whereas bidders may vary between full, partial and no cost past through.
Model prices in peak price periods were generally below the observed prices at the EEX. Figure 1 shows However, in peak periods, the competitive prices in the model tended to be lower than EEX prices.
The average price in 2006 at the EEX is 50.79 €/MWh whereas the model average is about 11% lower with 45.28 €/MWh. For the peak segment (weekdays 8am-8 pm), the difference is more striking with a model average price of 52.31 €/MWh (about 30% below the observed average of 74.48 €/MWh). For off-peak hours including holidays and weekends, the observed prices are lower with an average of 38.23 €/MWh compared to 41.54 €/MWh in the model. Focusing only on weekdays, this divergence is reduced to 1.4 €/MWh or 3%. Using the underlying demand, the total expenses at the EEX price level are 3.6 bn € higher than in the model.
Capacity withheld
To estimate the difference in quantities between the model and the EEX, we calculated the capacity withheld for weekday hours 8am-8pm (off-peak and weekend hours show a high degree of prices below marginal generation costs). Furthermore, market power abuse is expected to occur mainly when demand is close to the capacity limit. To obtain the withheld capacity all available plant capacities with marginal costs below the EEX price but not operating in the corresponding modeled solution for each hour are summed up.
In 2006, the average amount of capacity withheld during peak hours is about 8 GW, but it varies throughout the year. Figure 2 Shows that the average values in the first two months of around 9 GW, the gap then narrows significantly from March until June, even reaching an average of -2 GW in April.
After July, the capacity withheld again increases, with average values between 8.5 and 14 GW. The high number of values above 10 GW indicates the existence of strategic company behavior. 
Fixed cost coverage
One further point of interest is how competitive market outcomes translate into revenues for fixed cost covering. Pricing is based on short-term marginal costs; therefore, companies are expected to cover their investment costs when generators with higher costs set the market price or capacity is lower than demand, and both situations can result in price spikes that allow companies to "earn" rents above their generation costs. As mentioned, the German market is frequently subject to overcapacities. Thus, the price level is expected to give no signal for new investments. The earned revenues do not take into account forward trading. Thus, the values represent spot market based results.
Fehler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden werden. shows the calculated rents generators earned according to the model. As noted above, the European-wide emission allowance trading scheme includes a grandfathering mechanism that allows the revenues from opportunity pricing of allowances to be included in fixed cost covering. Hence, our model must incorporate both revenues for each plant type: one that includes allowance prices as marginal generation costs and one that excludes them. We use average investment costs as the benchmark. We can calculate an annuity assuming average overnight costs per MW, an interest rate of 7%, and 40 years' duration for base and 25 years for peak units.
Only the values including allowance costs are relevant for estimating market competitiveness. They reveal that under modeled competitive conditions, only nuclear plants can cover their fixed costs, under EEX price calculations, both nuclear and coal plants can cover their costs, and in both scenarios, peak load plants cannot cover their costs. 8 The results indicate that no additional capacities are needed in the postulated overcapacity of the German market. However, the results do not permit us to conclude empirical which mechanism (competitive system or the EEX market) is adequate for fixed costs covering. Due to the long term investment character of power plants, importance of forward contracts, fuel price variations, existence of optional markets like reserve markets, and the uncertain further development of the emission allowance system in Europe, consistent results regarding the issue of capacity financing can only be answered with long term analyses. 
Sensitivity Analysis
All model approaches are subject to simplifications, assumptions and mathematical restrictions.
Further, empirical analyses are affected by missing information and possible data errors. We undertook two sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of the obtained results. First, the fuel price level is varied by increasing prices for gas and oil by 10%. This should lead to an increase in peak prices when CCGT, gas turbines and oil-or gas-fired steam plants set the market price, while off-peak prices are unaffected. Second, we varied power plant availability. Due to a lack of hourly availability values only seasonal factors are used, which may misinterpret the real availability due to high temperatures, low water levels or plant outages. 11 The basic availability values from Hoster (1996) The impact of the changed fuel prices is only evident during peak load situations when the according plant capacities are needed. During these times the price level slightly increases. The average market price increases to 46.54 €/MWh (about 8% below EEX prices); average peak prices are 2.5 € above the base case and thus still 26% below the observed ones. The impact of reduced plant availability is more distinctive. During off-peak and mid-load periods, the difference is rather small because the remaining capacity is still sufficient to keep a moderate price level. During peak situations the prices are above the basic model results, particularly in winter and summer months. This effect can be explained by the steep slope of the merit order close to maximum capacity in combination with startup conditions that lead to prices above marginal costs. On average a market price of 48.74 €/MWh (4% below EEX prices) can be observed. Average peak prices increase to 59.55 €/MWh (20% below observed prices). In both sensitivities the off-peak prices are little affected.
However, even the reduced capacity is still sufficient to satisfy demand, thus no capacity rent for peak units can be expected. The average quantity gap in peak hours is reduced to 6.7 GW in the fuel price variation scenario and to 5.8 GW in the availability variation scenario. We verify the robustness of the results by carrying out two sensitivity analyses: first, fuel prices for peak units (oil and gas) are increased by 10%, and second, plant availability is reduced. The latter has a significant impact on the obtained results, increasing the average market price to 48.74 €/MWh.
However, the price duration curve still shows more than 2000 h with prices about 10 €/MWh below EEX prices. The models share an inability to reproduce the decrease of the EEX price duration curve to zero since the modeled prices are still at marginal generation cost level even in low demand offpeak hours. The average quantity gap is reduced to 6.7 and 5.8 GW respectively. However, in the second half of 2006 these values constantly remain above 10 GW.
We also calculate the revenues for generators based on the modeled and observed spot market prices.
The results show that under competitive conditions, the existing market structure and overcapacity of the German market does not lead to full-cost coverage, an expected result. Factoring in emission allowance prices as part of the fixed costs covering shifts the results in favor of coal plants, contrary to the desired political outcome.
While we acknowledge the conceptual data limitations of our model, the large number of significant price differentials and the corresponding quantity gaps indicate that the market is not yet sufficiently competitive to overcome market abuse.
